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Implications for Market Efficiency and Damages
Analyses of Plaintiff Interpretations of Halliburton
II’s Statement that “market efficiency is a matter of
degree”
David Tabak*
On June 23, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”) that prior case law
“affords defendants an opportunity to rebut the presumption by
showing, among other things, that the particular misrepresentation at
issue did not affect the stock’s market price.”1 While this has generally
been considered the key holding, it has not gone unnoticed that the
Court affirmed its prior ruling in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,2 mentioning
that the “presumption of reliance thus does not rest on a ‘binary’ view
of market efficiency”3 and, referring to the Brief for Petitioners, that the
“markets for some securities are more efficient than the markets for
others.”4 In this Article, I discuss the implications for a securities fraud
case of the proposition, apparently advanced by the plaintiffs’ bar, that
there is something new to be found in arguing that the security in
question in a securities litigation is “less efficient” than typical.
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1. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2414 (2014).
2. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
3. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410.
4. Id. at 2409.
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CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 483
INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”),5 affirming that
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson6 “affords defendants an opportunity to rebut the
presumption [of reliance at the class certification stage] by showing,
among other things, that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not
affect the stock’s market price.”7 While this opportunity to rebut price
impact at the class certification stage has generally been considered the
key holding in Halliburton II, it has not gone unnoticed that the Court
also stated that “Basic’s presumption of reliance thus does not rest on a
‘binary’ view of market efficiency. Indeed, in making the presumption
rebuttable, Basic recognized that market efficiency is a matter of degree
and accordingly made it a matter of proof”;8 thus the Halliburton II
Court noted, referring to the Brief for Petitioners, that the “markets for
some securities are more efficient than the markets for others.”9
I begin by looking at the roles that plaintiffs and defendants have in
analyzing market efficiency and how that may change following
Halliburton II. Following that, I examine the case where either
plaintiffs allege only a “less efficient” market or where the court,
perhaps based on arguments by defendants, holds that the market for the
security is of the less efficient variety. As discussed below, a less
efficient market may change the way that parties approach issues
including: (1) measurement of price reactions; (2) parsing of price
reactions; and (3) moving from price reactions to inflation at other
points during a class period. It should be noted that while all of the
views below are possible scenarios that may play out in different cases,
they will not apply in every case and it is unclear how often, indeed, if
ever, they will come into play in actual cases. Nevertheless, they
present analyses that, even if not applied, may influence how parties
approach certain aspects of cases just because they represent new
threats to be avoided or opportunities to be explored.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414.
Id. at 2410.
Id. at 2409.
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I. HALLIBURTON II AND PLAINTIFFS’ AND DEFENDANTS’
ROLES IN ARGUING MARKET EFFICIENCY
One noted plaintiffs’ attorney, Marc Gross, has predicted that “PostHalliburton II, plaintiffs will seize upon the Supreme Court’s rejection
of the ‘robust’ efficiency model in favor of a more relaxed, ‘generally’
efficient model.”10 As noted above, the Supreme Court actually
referred to its prior Basic decision in these statements,11 meaning that at
best, there is some additional clarity as to what should have been
already known to the relevant audience (or legal market). The attorney
then discusses two cases in which courts found that reactions to new
interpretations of already public news would not be consistent with the
efficient markets hypothesis.12 He then argues, “Thus, post-Halliburton
II, a statistically significant price reaction should be sufficient
regardless of whether the reaction takes place following the initial
announcement of the news, or sometime later when an analysis
‘spotlights’ its adverse impact on the company’s financial condition.”13
Arguably, if this claim were meritorious, then plaintiffs should have
already been making this argument, rather than finding that a
restatement by the Supreme Court of its views from Basic allows for
different “post-Halliburton II” interpretations of fact patterns that have
appeared before. But, assuming that plaintiffs will at least present such
interpretations when they have not before, one relevant question is
where that leads us.
While the ability to consider the price impact to “old news” is an
interesting proposition that may at first glance help plaintiffs, there are
several considerations to highlight. To begin, the idea that a price
reaction could occur “sometime later when” new analysis of already
known news is published would still be inconsistent with the standard
academic model of market efficiency, what Gross refers to as a “robust”
view.14 For plaintiffs to avail themselves of an argument that the
market was responding to a re-evaluation of prior information, they
should need to argue—and prove—that the market for the security in
question was not efficient in the standard academic sense, in which the

10. Marc I. Gross, Class Certification in a Post-Halliburton II World, LAW360 (July 21, 2014,
10:47 AM), http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/558536/class-certification-in-a-post-halli
burton-ii-world.
11. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409, 2414 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
12. Gross, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see, e.g., Andrew W. Lo, Efficient Markets Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, ONLINE EDITION (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds.,
2008), available at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_E000050.
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price response occurs when the news is first revealed.15
Perhaps, however, plaintiffs would simply argue that they have met
their burden to prove efficiency by showing efficiency at the lesser
level, while defendants would respond that if the plaintiffs’ expert’s
analysis is accepted, then plaintiffs must be bound by the strictures of
the standard academic definition, or “robust view,” of efficiency.16
That is, the parties recognize that plaintiffs still have the burden of
proving efficiency, but they disagree about the proper interpretation of
plaintiffs’ expert’s analyses. This could lead to some very interesting
debates about the interpretation of plaintiffs’ work, with plaintiffs’
expert potentially being asked if his or her analyses indicate a degree of
efficiency consistent with the standard academic view for the security in
question or some lower level of efficiency. If the expert answers that
the analyses support the standard academic view of efficiency, then the
argument for a price reaction to a “somewhat later” analysis would be
inconsistent with plaintiffs’ own proffered analyses. However, if
plaintiffs’ expert says that his or her analysis supports only a lesser
degree of efficiency, that of course opens the door to questioning on
which test(s) did not show the standard academic levels of efficiency,
on what type of “lesser” efficiency should result, and on what basis the
expert claims that the price reaction that follows old or repeated news is
actually due to the news given the specific form of “less efficient”
market the expert alleges exists.
Because of the clarity of the standard academic view of market
efficiency, many of the tests of that level of efficiency are at least clear
in principle (e.g., there should be no statistically significant
predictability of price movements17) or generally accepted in direction
(e.g., trading volume the number of analyst reports18). It is, at least
currently, unclear what results would support a “less efficient” market.
For example, how much predictability in price movements moves one
from the standard academic view of market efficiency to a “less
efficient” market to an inefficient market? Similarly, one could argue
that more analysts are indirect indicators of a more efficient market,
15. Note that one should not refer to this as a “strong” form of efficiency, as there is already a
standard terminology that categorizes markets as strong-form efficient (incorporating all private
and public information), semi-strong-form efficient (incorporating all public information), and
weak-form efficient (incorporating past prices).
16. Presumably, in providing an opinion on efficiency, plaintiffs and their expert should have
to describe the form of efficiency for which they argue. At a minimum, this is a fair topic to
explore in a deposition of plaintiffs’ expert.
17. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991)
(discussing predictability through the lens of market efficiency and equilibrium-pricing issues).
18. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
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making at least the direction of the test clear for the standard academic
view of efficiency, but how few analysts signal a drop from the standard
academic view of market efficiency to a “less efficient” form of
efficiency before one reaches a market that should be characterized as
inefficient? Experts arguing for “less efficient” markets may wind up
having to see if they can address these questions in a way that does not
run afoul of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.19 With
little or no academic basis for proving that a market is “less efficient,”
but not actually efficient in the academic sense nor inefficient, at least
initially, plaintiffs are likely to face substantial skepticism if they claim
to have threaded this needle, particularly based on their own
interpretations of commonly used tests.20
There is also the possibility of a role reversal between the parties at
the class certification stage. Suppose that there is a case with a single
alleged corrective disclosure with no associated price decline, but where
there is a “later” reiteration or re-analysis of the same information
followed by a price drop. Plaintiffs would hope to survive a challenge
to their unorthodox pleading of loss causation by arguing that the price
decline following this later announcement is consistent with a less
robust version of efficiency. It would then be in defendants’ interest to
prove that the security in question in fact traded in a market that is
efficient in the standard academic sense, such that the later re-analysis
could not have been the cause of any observed price movement. In such
a situation, defendants may be touting the efficiency of the market for

19. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“[T]he Rules of Evidence . . . do assign to the trial judge the
task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to
the task at hand.”).
20. One potential test that may be helpful would be to examine whether the security in
question consistently takes time to fully absorb news. If the security absorbs news quickly (e.g.,
there is no apparent excess volatility on the day after the day that the security first is affected by
news), that would argue for efficiency in the academic sense. And even if the security does take
time to fully absorb news, but does so in an inconsistent fashion, perhaps sometimes taking one
day and sometimes several days, then while this may argue for a “less efficient” market, such a
result merely postpones the question of how long it took to absorb any particular piece of news
such as a corrective disclosure. Similar tests may be possible for repeated news. Notably, unless
plaintiffs can show the manner in which the market departs from the standard academic model of
efficiency, they may have difficulty in conducting event studies on that security in a way that
properly accounts for that departure from inefficiency and does not appear designed to merely
yield a certain outcome. Put differently, even if plaintiffs met their burden of proving that a
market is “less efficient,” they still must conduct their event studies, including addressing the
question of whether a repetition or reinterpretation of old news merits an event study, in a manner
consistent with what they have proven about the market. Proof that a market is simply “less
efficient,” even if done properly, should not be a license to conduct any sort of event study with
no standards to ensure that the study reflects the type of departure from the standard academic
model of efficiency supposedly shown for the market in question.
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the security, while plaintiffs highlight any deviations from the standard
academic form of efficiency while being careful not to go so far as to
point at inefficiency. While we don’t know whether or how often this
may happen, it could result in some very interesting arguments, not only
when it is clear that the roles are reversed, but also perhaps even more
so if it is not obvious to one party that the other has effectively switched
sides in the efficiency debate.
II. MEASUREMENT OF PRICE REACTIONS
A traditional manner of analyzing price reactions is to keep the event
window, or the period over which the price movement is measured, as
short as practical.21 The Halliburton II decision notes that “Halliburton
cites studies purporting to show that ‘public information is often not
incorporated immediately (much less rationally) into market prices.’”22
The opinion then, referring to the Brief for Petitioners, states: “The
markets for some securities are more efficient than the markets for
others, and even a single market can process different kinds of
information more or less efficiently, depending on how widely the
information is disseminated and how easily it is understood.”23 Putting
these two quotes together, one may read the Halliburton II Court as
highlighting the non-binary view of efficiency from Basic and
endorsing the view that some markets can take time to process
information and thus can take time to impound information into the
price of a security, potentially opening up the question of how short an
event window should be.
In securities litigation, there is typically a default event window of a
single trading day that can be extended if it appears that the price of the
security is still unusually volatile (often measured by its continuing to
move by a statistically significant amount) the following day or
shortened, if that would help distinguish the price responses to two or
more separate intraday announcements.24 This procedure is reasonable
because for the purposes of a securities fraud case, an expert often is
attempting to measure the price impact of a particular announcement on
a particular security.25 There are situations in which the expert may

21. David Tabak & Frederick Dunbar, Materiality and Magnitude: Event Studies in the
Courtroom, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 19.1
(3d ed. 2001).
22. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2409 (2014) (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Tabak & Dunbar, supra note 21, at 19.4.
25. Some potential econometric considerations of this are discussed in Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric
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look at similar announcements, for example, to help in parsing a price
reaction by assessing the typical reaction of the market to one
component of the news. However, even then, it is still typical to begin
with an examination of the price reaction in question for the security at
issue in the case at bar. Because most securities cases focus on a very
limited number of potential disclosure events, it is generally possible to
examine whether there is a time stamp or other evidence of the time
within the day when an identified disclosure reached the public. In
addition, given the generally limited number of events, when there are
concerns about leakage before the identified disclosure, it may be worth
the effort to examine message boards or other sources that may
document such leakage. Thus, event studies in securities litigation have
tended to have a fairly precise focus on when news first entered the
market.
In contrast to the focus on a single security in most securities
litigation, “[a]n [academic] event study typically tries to examine return
behavior for a sample of firms experiencing a common type of event
(e.g., a stock split).”26 In those cases, the event window often covers a
full trading day or two for each of the events making up the sample.27
In academic studies covering numerous announcements, it was often
felt that it would be too difficult to determine the exact time when they
reached the market.28 Instead, relatively long event windows were
often used to increase the likelihood of capturing the relevant event.29
While improvements in information technology have allowed more
precise and less labor-intensive dating of identified announcements,30
Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 495, 496 (2013) (“This paper concerns single-firm event studies, which are
especially important in the context of securities litigation.”).
26. S. P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 3, 8 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007).
27. See A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 13, 15 (1997) (“In practice, the period of interest is often expanded to multiple days,
including at least the day of the announcement and the day after the announcement.”).
28. John J. Binder, The Event Study Methodology Since 1969, 11 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. &
ACCT. 111, 122–23 (1998).
29. Id.
30. For example, Dow Jones News/Retrieval began in 1973. See generally Sidney A.
Rosenzweig, Don’t Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright’s New-Use Doctrine to the
Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 902 n.13 (1995). It increased
its subscriber base substantially during the 1980s. See Start the Computers Stop the Presses!,
INFOWORLD, Mar. 30, 1981, at 26 (11,000 subscribers in 1981); Beth Krevitt Eres et al., A
Decision Maker’s Guide to Videotext and Teletext 56 (June 9, 1986) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000689/068919eb.pdf (205,000 subscribers
in 1986). Dow Jones News/Retrieval further expanded its strategy to target a broader audience in
the 1990s. See Geraldine Fabrikant, COMPANY NEWS: Dow Jones and West to Link Data
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the proliferation of alternative news sources, including Internet message
boards, now also means that there is a greater possibility of widespread
dissemination of rumors or information before an official
announcement, potentially supporting the use of some methodology that
may lead to an earlier start to an event window to capture the release of
news in event studies covering multiple securities.31
While a longer event window provides the benefit of increasing the
likelihood of capturing all of the relevant news releases, it also entails
the cost of capturing additional, unrelated news as well as random
fluctuations in the price of the security or securities being studied. For
academic event studies that involve analyses of multiple securities, this
cost tends to be muted; as price increases unrelated to the event being
studied in some securities will tend to offset similarly unrelated price
decreases in securities.32 In contrast, most securities litigations involve
one or more securities of the same issuer, meaning that the effects of
random noise affecting that one security or issuer are less likely to be
averaged out, and any price fluctuations after adjusting for market and
industry effects that are not caused by the actual news event under
consideration will be incorrectly attributed in full to that news, all of
which argues for a shorter event window in securities litigation.33
Services, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/18/business/companynews-dow-jones-and-west-to-link-data-services.html (“In yet another effort to make information
services more user friendly . . . .”). It was then merged into Factiva, currently a major source of
online news. FACTIVA replaces Dow Jones Interactive, PENN LIBR. (May 23, 2003),
http://www.library.upenn.edu/news/26.
31. For the results to still be scientific and have a known rate of error, one should employ a
standard protocol across all events. The protocol may allow for flexibility, such as moving the
start date earlier when there are comments, such as on message boards, describing a release of
news that already occurred. However, the methodology should not be based on price movements
before the known news release, as that confuses what is being measured (the price movement)
with the methodology for making the measurement and biases the analysis to pick up large but
not small random fluctuations immediately preceding a news release. In contrast, while not
standard, always starting the event window at a fixed period, such as two trading days, before the
news announcement, would at least be a valid methodology if consistently applied to all events.
32. See generally Binder, supra note 28 (discussing the methodology of academic event
studies). Technically, the noise component of the measured movements should be proportional to
the inverse of the square root of the number of events considered, assuming that they are in nonoverlapping time periods. So, for example, a study of 100 events should typically be expected to
have one-tenth the noise of that of a single event with the same length event window.
33. Similar issues occur with medical studies. If possible, medical studies are not performed
on a single patient but on a group of patients, as well as a control or placebo group. The length of
observation is often set beyond the period of expected efficacy or adverse side effects of the
treatment, under the assumption that with relatively large treatment and control groups, later
results will be similar if the treatment has no long-term effects, but that differing long-term results
may indicate a longer treatment effect than previously anticipated. In contrast, if one dealt with a
single patient, it would typically be harder to say if unexpected long-term effects were due to
unanticipated effects of the treatment or to some development unrelated to the treatment.
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Moreover, relative to other events, allegedly corrective disclosures that
lead to securities litigation are more likely to be unexpected and to
cause relatively large price responses, which in turn are more likely to
continue influencing price movements for a longer period of time.34
What does that mean for analyses in securities cases in situations
where plaintiffs argue that they have shown that the market for a
security is of the “less efficient” variety that may fail to incorporate
information quickly? An implication is that the end point for the event
window now arguably could be extended further because there is more
reason to believe that the “signal” from the disclosure is continuing to
influence security price movements. Thus, this may lead to a further
dispute among the parties and the experts as to how far out to look to
account for further declines and/or reversals of price movements
following allegedly corrective disclosures.35
Another potential dispute may involve the consideration of whether
news from before the alleged corrective disclosure was still having an
influence during the event window. After all, if the news from the
corrective disclosure can still influence price changes “sometime later,”
and particularly if it is argued that it may do so even after the price of
the security has settled down, then why can’t news before the corrective
disclosure have a similarly long-lasting or delayed effect? So, if there is
a corrective disclosure and subsequent price decline on Thursday, and if
plaintiffs argue that the security in question traded in a “less efficient”
market, it would seem that defendants should be able to argue that
perhaps some or all of the price drop may be the result of, say, a prior
news announcement unrelated to the allegations on Monday of that
week. As a first pass, assuming identical impact periods for all news
seems compelling, whether it is the Thursday corrective disclosure or
the Monday confounding news, meaning that plaintiffs should not be
able to try to claim the potential benefits of a less efficient market
without also being subject to ways that the same theory could reduce or

34. Dmitry Krivin et al., Determination of the Appropriate Event Window Length in
Individual Stock Event Studies 23 (Nov. 4, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466161.
35. The Krivin et al. paper uses a baseline rule common to some experts to continue the event
window through each day in which there is a statistically significant price movement unless other
news enters the market. Id. at 8–9. Generally, this can be thought of as saying that the window is
kept open until it appears that the price movements settle down. With a “less efficient” market,
however, one might question whether the influence of a disclosure settles down and then
somehow appears again. An interesting debate may develop as to what evidence may support
such a position and whether the expert is using a generally accepted or even published
methodology with controlling standards and a known rate of error in arguing that news has a
delayed effect or that repeated news has a new effect on the price of a security.
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eliminate their damages claims.
To make the situation even more complicated, recall that the
Halliburton II decision referred to the Brief for Petitioners’ view that
“even a single market can process different kinds of information more
or less efficiently, depending on how widely the information is
disseminated and how easily it is understood.”36 This opens up several
new lines of inquiry, both for alleged corrective disclosures and other
news events. Perhaps experts may begin counting the number of news
stories and analyst reports to examine “how widely the information is
disseminated” for both alleged corrective disclosures as well as for
potentially confounding news during and before the event window for
the corrective disclosure. Reviews of analyst reports, including changes
to price targets and earnings (and other financial) estimates may provide
guidance as to whether the information was easily understood, as
exemplified by immediate and consistent changes in these measures
across analysts in the case of easily understood information and by
delayed or inconsistent changes across analysts in the case of less easily
understood information. It is not clear whether and how such measures
might come into play, and whether a consensus will develop on either
point, but the statements about degrees of efficiency in Halliburton II
appear to at least initially open the door to a re-examination of how to
construct an event window when a security is deemed to trade in a “less
efficient” market.
One important concern here is that the parties may not recognize how
the potential for different event windows may affect the measures of
statistical significance for any given price reaction. To see this, we
should begin with the standard definition of statistical significance, here
taken from the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence: “the
probability of getting data as extreme as, or more extreme than, the
actual data—given that the null hypothesis is true.”37 That is, statistical
significance is the rate of false positives, meaning the probability of
getting a result (here, a price movement) as large (extreme) as or larger
(more extreme) than what was actually observed when the null
hypothesis is true (here, there was no material event). In discussing the
cutoff level for statistical significance, this same source further notes,
“In practice, statistical analysts typically use levels of 5% and 1%. The
5% level is the most common in social science, and an analyst who
speaks of significant results without specifying the threshold probably is

36. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. — 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2409 (2014).
37. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 250 (3d ed. 2010).
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using this figure.”38 This means that if one randomly selected a date
when there was no material news, there should be only a five percent
chance that the associated stock price movement (net of market and/or
industry effects) would be large enough, solely due to chance, to be
deemed statistically significant. In legal terms, this would be the
“known or potential rate of error” relevant to the consideration of expert
testimony.39
However, suppose that the expert considers two possible windows,
such as one around the initial disclosure of an event and a second when
the event is discussed at a later point by an analyst. If the event was not
material, in the sense of not being expected to have an impact on the
stock price, then the potential error rate is no longer five percent, but
roughly twice that, or about ten percent, because two tests were
undertaken.40 As noted by the Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence, “[r]epeated testing complicates the interpretation of
significance levels. If enough comparisons are made, random error
almost guarantees that some will yield ‘significant’ findings, even when
there is no real effect.”41 In situations where the expert has multiple
ways to show statistical significance, “courts should not be overly
impressed with claims that estimates are significant. Instead, they
should be asking how analysts developed their models.”42 That is, no
adjustment will typically be warranted where an expert always follows
the same procedure (and only one event is tested), for example by
looking only at the first time news is disclosed and following a set rule
for the length of the event window.43 In contrast, if an expert would
consider testing for statistical significance every time that an analyst
discusses the news after the initial disclosure, then he or she is engaging
in repeated testing, and should adjust his or her calculations of statistical
significance to make them accurate and not subject to being dismissed
as unreliable.44

38. Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).
39. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
40. Technically, because these are designed to be two independent tests, the probability of
finding a result that meets the criterion for statistical significance of a single test at the 5% level
should be 1 - (1 - 0.05) x (1 - 0.05), or 1 - (0.95)2, or 0.975, or 9.75%. In some cases, however,
additional statistical considerations may come into play.
41. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 37, at 256.
42. Id. at 256–57 (footnote omitted).
43. Of course, it still remains true that multiple-comparison adjustments may be required
when multiple events are tested.
44. Note that the adjustment would need to be made based on all the possible tests that the
expert could have made under whatever methodology they employ, not just on the ones that they
ultimately rely on. For example, if Analysts A and B both discuss the news at a later date, the
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Similarly, the length of an event window is another area where an
expert could engage in repeated testing. A solid procedure would be to
use a rule to determine the length of each event window (e.g., continue
through each day with no new news and with a statistically significant
daily return), while ad hoc approaches that let an expert select various
possible event windows allow for multiple answers, and thus multiple
possible chances to produce a result showing a “significant” price
movement. At a minimum, such ad hoc approaches would call for
multiple-comparison adjustments; more generally, their nature may be
such that even such corrections are insufficient and the results remain
unreliable.
III. PARSING OF PRICE REACTIONS
A second area where less efficient markets may come into play is in
the parsing of price reactions to news that includes, but does not consist
solely of, a corrective disclosure. For example, suppose a company
announces that it is lowering guidance for Division A by seven cents
per share and for Division B by three cents per share. Further suppose
that the parties agree that both pieces of information came as a complete
surprise to the market and that the resulting decline in the company’s
share price was $10 per share. Finally, suppose that the allegation in
this case is that the company knew and should have previously
disclosed the entire seven-cent per share guidance change for Division
A, but that the change in guidance at Division B was a timely
disclosure.
If the company’s stock trades in an efficient market, it is fairly easy
to move from this disclosure to a preliminary conclusion that $7 per
share of the price decline is due to the news about Division A and $3
per share of the price decline is due to the news about Division B,
resulting in inflation of $7 per share. A potentially hidden assumption

expert cannot test only the reaction to the discussion by Analyst B without some reliable basis for
doing so and thereby count only two tests (the initial disclosure and the reaction following
Analyst B’s later discussion). Particularly improper would be relying on the later price
movements to determine which statements to test to see if they are associated with stock price
movements. This is a nearly circular procedure in which one formally tests only the dates with
large price movements based on either formal or informal observations of the stock price data,
whether by the expert or by the lawyers who decided which events to include in a complaint or
other legal document. The best practice would be for the expert to define a specific rule for
which dates to test (e.g., initial disclosures and any analyst reports that specifically mention the
news in a headline). The quality of the rule could then be assessed via traditional methods
employed in litigation such as examination of the sensitivity of the results to alternative rules and
questioning the expert as to whether he or she uses the same rule consistently or appears to adopt
different rules in different cases with no basis for doing so.
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here is that the seven- and three-cent changes in guidance have expected
discounted present values summed over future time periods that still
maintain the seven-to-three ratio. If that assumption can be deemed
valid, then an expert can argue that if the market for the company’s
stock is efficient, then the price of the company’s shares is equal to the
discounted value of expected future cash flows, meaning that if the
changes in those expected discounted values are in a seven-to-three
ratio, the price reaction should similarly be divided in a seven-to-three
ratio.45
But, once “a single market can process different kinds of information
more or less efficiently, depending on how widely the information is
disseminated and how easily it is understood,”46 we are potentially open
to a new world of investigation. Suppose that some analysts discuss
both divisions, some discuss only Division A, and some discuss only
Division B. Could that be the basis for a claim that the information
about the two divisions was not equally widely disseminated? Further
suppose that the amount of discussion of the two divisions is not equal
in the analyst reports. Does more discussion of one division mean that
information about that division was more widely disseminated and thus
more worthy of discussion (i.e., material), or could it mean that that the
information about that division was less easily understood and merited
further analyst review and commentary?47
While the seven-to-three ratio in this example would still presumably
carry weight as an initial starting point, once markets are “less
efficient,” there may be openings to argue that the market weighs
different pieces of news in ways that do not conform to the standard
paradigm of rational behavior. Assuming this is the case, in some
instances, the dispute would solely be between plaintiffs and
defendants, with plaintiffs wanting to put more weight on portions of
the news that are part of the allegations in the case while defendants
wish to do the opposite. In some instances, a dispute could even arise

45. Here, we abstract from questions such as whether there are other potential issues such as
reputation effects, and, if so, whether those other issues are properly even part of a damages claim
or how they are allocated across the different parts of the news event containing the corrective
disclosure. The seven-to-three ratio could change if other considerations enter the picture.
46. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. — 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2409 (2014).
47. A tool to quantify such effects, known as content analysis, was recently endorsed by the
First Circuit in Bricklayers and Trowel Trades International Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC, 752 F.3d 82, 96 n.12 (1st Cir. 2014). Content analysis involves the
counting and/or statistical analysis of mentions of terms to evaluate how much importance the
concepts behind those terms by authors, often acting on the perceived importance or interest of
those concepts to their readership, at one or more points in time.
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among plaintiffs, such as in a situation where some investors purchased
after one alleged misrepresentation but before a second one. In that
type of situation, the early purchasers would have a financial interest in
attributing as much as possible of the price decline following a
corrective disclosure to the alleged misrepresentation before their
purchase (i.e., the statement they could have relied upon).
Later purchasers, or those who purchased after both alleged
misrepresentations, have a more complicated set of concerns. One
important objective for them may be allocating a disproportionate share
of the price decline following a corrective disclosure to the alleged
misrepresentation for which they are more likely to recover. For
example, if there is more of a risk that the court or a jury will find that
the first alleged misrepresentation was not made with scienter, then later
purchasers would, ceteris paribus, increase their expected recovery by
allocating more of the loss to the second misrepresentation.
IV. MOVING FROM PRICE REACTIONS TO INFLATION AT
OTHER POINTS IN TIME
A third area in which a less efficient market may be relevant is the
use of price reactions, typically at the point of a corrective disclosure, to
calculate inflation at other points in time. To see why this may be an
issue, consider first a common approach to calculating inflation over a
class period with a single alleged misrepresentation and a single alleged
corrective disclosure. First, the price reaction associated with the
corrective disclosure is calculated, meaning that the total price
movement following the disclosure is measured and adjusted to remove
the effects of market and/or industry factors as well as any confounding
news.
Suppose that an expert calculates that a stock that was trading at $80
prior to the corrective disclosure fell by $20 due to the corrective news
in that disclosure. The second step for the expert to take is to translate
this estimated reduction in inflation at the end of the class period into a
measure of inflation at earlier points in time. Two of the most common
starting points for this are the “constant-dollar” method, in which the
earlier inflation is $20 per share, and the “constant-percentage” method,
in which the earlier inflation is twenty-five percent of the stock price at
any point in time.48 Both of these figures may be adjusted to account
for multiple alleged misrepresentations and/or corrective disclosures, as
48. See, e.g., David Tabak, Inflation and Damages in a Post-Dura World 1–3 (Sept. 15, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=10173
34 (discussing these two methods for modeling inflation).
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well as for changes in the value of the misrepresentations, as discussed
below. Finally, in turning the inflation into damages, any legal
requirements, such as limitations from the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act or any requirements that are generally interpreted to flow
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo,49 are implemented.50
The basic theory behind using a constant-dollar or constantpercentage inflation is that in the absence of a changing economic
environment or other factors, news that is valued at a certain amount at
one point in time would be valued at the same amount at other points in
time. This can be justified by reliance on the efficient market to
consistently value information based on whatever is the appropriate
valuation technique. However, if the market is “less efficient,” then it
becomes more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to rely on it to provide
consistent valuations. One problem with a less efficient market is that
there are many possible deviations from efficiency, and a lack of
consistency is one of them. It is of course possible that the inefficiency
is either a slow but consistent incorporation of news or that it is an
incorrect incorporation of news that at least is consistently incorrect in
the same fashion. In the former case, that of a slow incorporation of
news, one may ask whether the full amount of inflation should be
assumed to be present at the point of a misrepresentation and especially
at the point of an omission. If plaintiffs argue that the market
incorporates news slowly, then they may have to accept arguments that
the effects of any misrepresentation only affected the price of the
security slowly as well.51
To return to changes in the value of a misrepresentation, suppose that
an oil exploration company falsely announces that it has uncovered a
field at which it would cost $40 per barrel to extract oil. If the price of
oil is $15 per barrel and expected to stay at approximately that price, the

49. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
50. See, e.g., Tabak, supra note 48 (examining the requirements that flow from the Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. decision).
51. In the case of a material affirmative misrepresentation, meaning, generally, new allegedly
false information that is alleged to have increased the price of a security, one may wish to
examine the timing of the actual price movement following that news. In the case of an omission
or a misrepresentation that maintained prior expectations and thus should not have affected the
price of a security, the most relevant analysis may involve examining the speed of the security’s
response to other releases of new information. Notably, if plaintiffs are arguing that a security
traded in a “less efficient” market, they may have already argued that the security in question did
not incorporate news as rapidly as is the case in a “more-efficient” market, and then may have to
accept that any alleged inflation did not start out equal to the full claimed effect of any alleged
misrepresentation.
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value of the misrepresentation is likely to be small, as it represents only
the possibility for value to the company in an unlikely future. If,
however, the price of oil rises to $70 per barrel and is expected to stay
at similarly high levels, then the value of the misrepresentation would
be higher, as the company could begin earning profits quickly
(assuming that the time and cost of beginning extraction are small) and
would be expected to do so for an extended period of time. One can
imagine similar influences on other types of misrepresentations; for
example, a disclosure about the share of a financial institution’s
portfolio composed of subprime assets would be likely to have a greater
impact in periods where investors are concerned about subprime loans
than in periods where there was no such concern.
Whenever there is likely to be a material change in the value of a
misrepresentation during a class period, experts should consider
whether to adjust the level of inflation over time rather than holding it
constant at either the dollar or percentage amount at the time of the
corrective disclosure. When one assumes an efficient market, then it
follows that the market price should reflect a rational accounting for
changes in economic conditions. For example, an expert could measure
the value of yet unexploited oil by creating a model of the expected
future price paths of oil, determining when it would pay for the
company to exploit the oil (accounting for any initial start-up costs that
may make the decision more complicated than to just exploit oil
whenever its price exceeds the marginal cost of extraction), and then
properly valuing the potential outcomes.52 If the market for the security
is efficient, then market participants as a group can be assumed to have
performed, or would have performed, an analysis of that nature to value
the misrepresentation as a function of relevant changing economic
conditions.
However, if the market is assumed to be less efficient and not
properly processing information, one can ask what basis one would
have for translating price reactions at one point in time into estimates of
inflation at another point with materially different, or perhaps even
unchanged, relevant economic conditions. In some situations, the
expert may be able to rely on analyst reports that actually contain a
model that explicitly accounts for the relevant economic factor(s).
When there is no such evidence, the expert may be able to rely on
historical data from the same company or peers, such as earningsresponse coefficients in the case of alleged misrepresentations of
earnings. Even when there is no outside evidence for how the market
52. This is a form of real-option problem with known valuation techniques.
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responded, or would have responded, to the interaction between the
subject of the misrepresentation and changing economic conditions, an
expert may still argue that the rational response is the best estimate for
what the market would have done. But, in that case, there is the obvious
tension of arguing that the rational, or efficient, response is the best way
to model the market’s reaction when plaintiffs either failed to or did not
attempt to show that the market did actually tend to generally respond to
news in a rational, efficient manner.
CONCLUSION
Much of the early focus on Halliburton II deals with the likely impact
of the ruling that defendants may attempt to rebut the presumption of
reliance at class certification by showing a lack of price impact. Yet,
there is another portion of the ruling that deserves consideration: that
the Supreme Court has affirmed its belief that market efficiency is not
“binary,” but rather favorably cited the Petitioner’s argument that “that
market efficiency is a matter of degree,” and that “even a single market
can process different kinds of information more or less efficiently,
depending on how widely the information is disseminated and how
easily it is understood.”53
Initially, a renewed focus on different degrees of efficiency would
seem to help plaintiffs by lowering the burden for showing that a
security traded in a market efficient enough to trigger the presumption
of reliance. At least one prominent plaintiffs’ attorney has argued that
the additional clarity on this issue that he believes is found in
Halliburton II will also help plaintiffs by allowing them to consider
price movements in response to new interpretations of previously
released news. This leads to the interesting question of whether, if that
occurs, it will be defendants arguing that the security traded in a more
“robust” manner, meaning one consistent with the academic definition
of efficiency, while plaintiffs highlight the less efficient nature of the
market. Of course, in that situation, defendants can similarly use
plaintiffs’ argument about a lesser degree of market efficiency to
consider later favorable re-evaluations of corrective disclosures or to
argue that part of the price movement following an alleged corrective
disclosure should actually be attributed to the re-evaluation of some
prior non-actionable news. Finally, there are often portions of a
damages analysis that may implicitly rely on an efficient market, such
as parsing a price reaction or taking the measured price reaction at one
53. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. — 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2409 (2014).
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point in time and using it as a basis for estimating inflation at another
point in time. To the extent that plaintiffs prove only that a security
traded in a “less efficient” market, then they may invite a challenge to
their later damages analysis. Whether and how some or all of these
possibilities play out will be something to look for as we navigate a
post-Halliburton II world.

